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Calculo Cuantitativo Prospect Theory

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Cumulative Prospect Calculator⁠

Prospect analysis qualitative

Prospect analysis qualitative

Proposer

Turno

Ronda

Receiver

Proposal

Reference endowment qualitative

Contexto

Frame

Outcome 1

New endowment qualitative 1

Potential gains

Potential loss

The power of gains

The power of losses

Loss aversion

Prob. Success of outcome

Prob. Weighting for loss

Prob. Weighting for gain

Decision weight of Outcome 1

Value of Outcome 1

Total Value of Proposal

Certaintity equivalent

Decision

Enjoying power position

Fiscal deficit high

Regulator has lost prestige and support

Improve image with power groups

Regain power

Very positive

000

0.9

000

0.4

0000

2.25

000

0.2

000

0.5

000

0.4

000

0.6

000

0.5

0000

1.25

000

0.6

000

0.2

000

0.5

000

0.8

000

0.5

000

3.5

000

0.2

000

0.7

000

0.3

000

0.9

000

0.2

000

2.5

000

0.6

000

0.5

000

0.6

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Caso Crisis Misiles en Cuba Prof. Mark Haas⁠

(1)

Postulados Teoría de Prospectos 2

Postulados Teoría de Prospectos 2

Actor

Situacion del decisor (Frame)

Descripcion

Iniciativa

Beneficios potenciales

Descripcion balance

Costos potenciales

Descripcion costos

Posicionamiento del resultado en la curva de Ganancias y perdidas

Image

Probabilidad de exito

Asignacion de peso a la probabilidad de exito

Grafico

Rechazo al Riesgo

Busqueda Maximiza Ganancias?

Actitud hacia el riesgo segun frame

Decision posible

Fuerte presion internacional

Aumentar represion Control hegemonico

Restablecer balance de poder, Mejora situacion del lider interna

Posible guerra con US

Se arriesga a aumentar represion

Resquebrajamiebto cohesion interna

Mantener represion selectiva y oposicion controlada

Evita confrontacion con US

Humillacion internacional

Mantiene status quo

Problemas internos Grave confontacion grupos

Responde a represion con actos de fuerza

USA resalta imagen lucha por democracia

Posible guerra con USSR

Bloquea paises apoyan a Maduro

Jugada de bloqueo rescata imagen de lider

Incrementa presion y discurso amenazante

Sigue en aumento credibilidad

Incrementa posibilidad de guerra con USSR

Incrementa presion

There are no rows in this table

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“Applied to the Cuban missile crisis, the above expected-value calculations generate the following predictions. First, as I demonstrate in subsequent analysis, it is clear that Khrushchev was experiencing significant domestic and international losses at the time he made his decision to send missiles to Cuba. This fact in all likelihood generated a low utility value associated with maintaining the policies that led to his current position. He therefore faced strong incentives to try to change the status quo. Nevertheless, if the utility value—low as it may have been—that was associated with the status quo was greater than the sum of the anticipated costs that would be generated by a hostile American response to the placement of offensive missiles in Cuba ~in the form of either deterrent compelled threats or immediate military hostilities! and the anticipated benefits of a successful attempt to change the status quo, theories based on the maximization of expected value would predict that the Soviet leader should not have opted for this policy to alleviate his current predicament. An analogous situation existed for Kennedy after the missiles were discovered

in Cuba. As will be seen, this discovery generated significant international and domestic costs for the president—a fact that made his utility associated with accepting Khrushchev’s challenge quite low. Nevertheless, if this value was greater than the sum of the anticipated benefits associated with having Khrushchev retreat from his gamble as a result of American pressure and the anticipated costs of Khrushchev continuing with his challenge in the face of American threats ~which include the potential costs of war resulting from accident or

miscalculation!, expected-utility theory would predict that Kennedy should have accepted a change in the status quo despite the harm this outcome generated for him.

Finally, there can be no doubt that Khrushchev’s utility generated by capitulating to Kennedy’s threats over the Cuban missiles had a very low value. Yet if the sum of the anticipated benefits of defying Kennedy and ultimately succeeding with the Cuban initiative and the anticipated costs of either Kennedy making good on his threats or war resulting from accident or miscalculation was less than the damage done by capitulation, removing the missiles was a value-

maximizing choice”

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