Recursos

Calculo Cuantitativo Prospect Theory


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Prospect analysis qualitative
0
Proposer
Turno
Ronda
Receiver
Proposal
Reference endowment qualitative
Contexto
Frame
Outcome 1
New endowment qualitative 1
Potential gains
Potential loss
The power of gains
The power of losses
Loss aversion
Prob. Success of outcome
Prob. Weighting for loss
Prob. Weighting for gain
Decision weight of Outcome 1
Value of Outcome 1
Total Value of Proposal
Certaintity equivalent
Decision
Proposer
Turno
Ronda
Receiver
Proposal
Reference endowment qualitative
Contexto
Frame
Outcome 1
New endowment qualitative 1
Potential gains
Potential loss
The power of gains
The power of losses
Loss aversion
Prob. Success of outcome
Prob. Weighting for loss
Prob. Weighting for gain
Decision weight of Outcome 1
Value of Outcome 1
Total Value of Proposal
Certaintity equivalent
Decision
1
Regulator
T1
R1
Power
Increase 30%
Enjoying power position
Fiscal deficit high
Regulator has lost prestige and support
Improve image with power groups
Regain power
Very positive
000
0.9
000
0.4
0000
2.25
000
0.2
000
0.5
000
0.4
20
Play
2
Regulator
T2
R1
Regulator
Do not increase tarif
000
0.6
000
0.5
0000
1.25
000
0.6
000
0.2
000
0.5
0
3
Regulator
T3
R1
Ministry of Industry
Do not increase tarif
000
0.8
000
0.5
000
3.5
000
0.2
000
0.7
000
0.3
0
4
000
0.9
000
0.2
000
2.5
000
0.6
000
0.5
000
0.6
0
There are no rows in this table

Postulados Teoría de Prospectos 2
1
Actor
Situacion del decisor (Frame)
Descripcion
Iniciativa
Beneficios potenciales
Descripcion balance
Costos potenciales
Descripcion costos
Posicionamiento del resultado en la curva de Ganancias y perdidas
Image
Probabilidad de exito
Asignacion de peso a la probabilidad de exito
Grafico
Rechazo al Riesgo
Busqueda Maximiza Ganancias?
Actitud hacia el riesgo segun frame
Decision posible
Actor
Situacion del decisor (Frame)
Descripcion
Iniciativa
Beneficios potenciales
Descripcion balance
Costos potenciales
Descripcion costos
Posicionamiento del resultado en la curva de Ganancias y perdidas
Image
Probabilidad de exito
Asignacion de peso a la probabilidad de exito
Grafico
Rechazo al Riesgo
Busqueda Maximiza Ganancias?
Actitud hacia el riesgo segun frame
Decision posible
1
Maduro
Esta en situacion de perdidas
Fuerte presion internacional
Aumentar represion Control hegemonico
Beneficios Altos
Restablecer balance de poder, Mejora situacion del lider interna
Costos Muy altos
Posible guerra con US
Por debajo del Punto de referencia
value funcion Prospedtiva.png
Prob Exito Media
Aumenta el peso
Probability Weighting.png
Rechazo al Riesgo disminuye significativamente
Se arriesga a aumentar represion
2
Maduro
Esta en situacion de perdidas
Resquebrajamiebto cohesion interna
Mantener represion selectiva y oposicion controlada
Beneficios Altos
Evita confrontacion con US
Costos Muy altos
Humillacion internacional
Por arriba del Punto de Referencia (Ganancia)
value funcion Prospedtiva.png
Prob Exito Muy baja
Disminuye el peso
weighting proability.jpg
Rechazo al Riego Aumenta
Mantiene status quo
3
USA
Esta en situacion de perdidas
Problemas internos Grave confontacion grupos
Responde a represion con actos de fuerza
Benficios Bajos
USA resalta imagen lucha por democracia
Costos Muy altos
Posible guerra con USSR
Muy Por arriba del Punto de Referencia (Ganancia)
value funcion Prospedtiva.png
Prob Exito Media
Disminuye el peso
weighting proability.jpg
Rechazo al Riesgo Disminuye
Bloquea paises apoyan a Maduro
4
USA
Esta en situacion de ganancias
Jugada de bloqueo rescata imagen de lider
Incrementa presion y discurso amenazante
Beneficios Altos
Sigue en aumento credibilidad
Costos Muy altos
Incrementa posibilidad de guerra con USSR
Por arriba del Punto de Referencia (Ganancia)
value funcion Prospedtiva.png
Prob. Exito Muy Alta
Disminuye el peso
weighting proability.jpg
Rechazo al Riesgo Disminuye
Incrementa presion
5
6
There are no rows in this table

“Applied to the Cuban missile crisis, the above expected-value calculations generate the following predictions. First, as I demonstrate in subsequent analysis, it is clear that Khrushchev was experiencing significant domestic and international losses at the time he made his decision to send missiles to Cuba. This fact in all likelihood generated a low utility value associated with maintaining the policies that led to his current position. He therefore faced strong incentives to try to change the status quo. Nevertheless, if the utility value—low as it may have been—that was associated with the status quo was greater than the sum of the anticipated costs that would be generated by a hostile American response to the placement of offensive missiles in Cuba ~in the form of either deterrent compelled threats or immediate military hostilities! and the anticipated benefits of a successful attempt to change the status quo, theories based on the maximization of expected value would predict that the Soviet leader should not have opted for this policy to alleviate his current predicament. An analogous situation existed for Kennedy after the missiles were discovered
in Cuba. As will be seen, this discovery generated significant international and domestic costs for the president—a fact that made his utility associated with accepting Khrushchev’s challenge quite low. Nevertheless, if this value was greater than the sum of the anticipated benefits associated with having Khrushchev retreat from his gamble as a result of American pressure and the anticipated costs of Khrushchev continuing with his challenge in the face of American threats ~which include the potential costs of war resulting from accident or
miscalculation!, expected-utility theory would predict that Kennedy should have accepted a change in the status quo despite the harm this outcome generated for him.
Finally, there can be no doubt that Khrushchev’s utility generated by capitulating to Kennedy’s threats over the Cuban missiles had a very low value. Yet if the sum of the anticipated benefits of defying Kennedy and ultimately succeeding with the Cuban initiative and the anticipated costs of either Kennedy making good on his threats or war resulting from accident or miscalculation was less than the damage done by capitulation, removing the missiles was a value-
maximizing choice”
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