In Part III, I explore why, despite their promise, these processes nonetheless fall short of the normative model of col?laboration described in Part I. The analysis in this part sheds light on the incentives needed to encourage collaboration and delineates the conditions most favorable to its emergence. There are myriad reasons why collaborative governance remains an ideal and not a reality. For example, while regulatory negotiation can foster creative problem solving, the process is ultimately structured in a way that limits creativity and draws parties toward “split-the-difference” bargaining.
(7, administrative state)
Reformers believed that if parties had no “ownership” over the rule-making process, they would be less likely to view rules as legitimate.
(12)
Moreover, informal rule making and implementation suffers from a conceptual divide between legitimate public and private roles in governance. Because private parties are viewed as purely self-interested and unaccountable, the agency alone promulgates, implements, and enforces regulations; the agency alone is responsible for protecting the public in?terest. In traditional rule making, interest groups, private parties, and local communities are experienced as a threat to the integrity and expertise of the agency. As a result, regulation overburdens agencies and undervalues the capacity of nongovernmental groups to participate in governance.
(13)
Career staff, many of whom are likely to outlast political appointees, may resist changes that conflict with their own view of the agency's statutory mission, sometimes by appealing to Congress.
The tenure of Reagan appointee Ann Gorsuch as Administrator of the EPA was marked by staff resistance to the administration's attempt to change the agency's goals. See Riley E. Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in Environmental Politics and Policy 63, 97 (James P. Lester ed., 1995). On staff conflicts with Gorsuch and the role played by a congressional oversight committee in securing her dismissal, see Landy et al., supra note 29, at 250-51 (footnote 33, p.13)
Even *14 when agency staff wish to change course, institutional culture and reward systems do not shift overnight.
Values may be defined as ‘concepts or beliefs, [about] desirable end states or beha?viours, [which] transcend specific situations, [and] guide selection or evaluation of be?haviour and events, and are ordered by relative importance’ (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990, p. 878). Schwartz (1990, 1992) developed a Values Inventory, comprising 56 ‘guiding principles in life’ and his work has been validated in many transnational studies. This research suggests that human values can be grouped into 10 motivational domains and two dimensions (self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservatism).
Schwartz, S. H. & Bilsky, W. (1990) Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: extensions and cross-cultural replications, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 878–891
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