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Motivations of German lecturers. Economics and politics of german universities
1 Base pay structure
Table 79
Position
Typical pay rule
Direct link to class size/pass rate?
Professors (W-1, W-2, W-3)
Fixed federal/Länder salary table (“W-Besoldung”) plus optional individual Leistungs??bezüge bonuses
No – neither the basic salary nor the usual bonuses are formula-linked to student head-count or pass-rates ()
Adjunct/Lehr?beauftragte
Flat €15–50 per teaching hour set by university/Land
No – rate is per hour; the course can be cancelled (or unpaid) if < 5 students enroll, but the pay does not rise with larger groups (, )
There are no rows in this table
2 What can raise a professor’s pay
3 Institution-level performance funds (LOM) – indirect only
Länder such as NRW, BW and Berlin allocate 20-30 % of their university block grant by formula. One main indicator is the number of graduates, with extra weight for finishing on time (factor 1.5) – i.e. completion counts, not grade averages (, ).
Universities may trickle some of that money down to faculties or individuals, but the internal rules vary and are usually negotiated rather than automatic. No Land currently rewards individual professors directly for bigger classes or higher average marks.
4 Negative incentives / sanctions
).5 Bottom line
Sources (in order cited)
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1 SWS (“Semester-Wochen?stunde”)
Table 77
Typical compulsory load (“Lehrdeputat”)
Research universities
Universities of applied sciences (FH)
Full professors (W2/W3)
9 SWS in NRW (8-10 in most Länder)
18 SWS
Junior professors / tenure-track
4 – 6 SWS
n.a.
Full-time academic staff
4 – 9 SWS, depending on contract
Adjuncts (Lehrbeauftragte)
contract states the number of SWS they are hired for; same definition
There are no rows in this table
2 Money linked to programme popularity / head-counts
Table 78
Level
Mechanism
Who gets the cash?
Effect on an individual lecturer’s salary
Federal/Länder pacts (2007-2020 Hochschulpakt; since 2021 Zukunfts?vertrag Studium & Lehre)
Flat payment per additional first-year student (e.g. ≈ €26 000 per head in phase 2; half from Bund, half from the Land)
University central budget
NRW LOM 2023
20 % of the block grant is re-allocated each year; 45 % of this pot is driven by the number of graduates, not enrolments
University
Indirect only; faculties that deliver more graduates may negotiate more posts or bonuses, but no automatic personal pay rise
Internal faculty schemes (e.g. Bonn Medical School)
Budget shares weighted by delivered SWS (larger groups → higher SWS value) plus student-evaluation scores
Institute/clinic budget
Possible internal mini-bonuses (travel money, tutors) but still not salary-linked ()
There are no rows in this table
Bottom line: High enrolment makes it easier for a department to get extra money or positions, but professors and adjuncts do not receive a head-count bonus in their payslip.
3 Incentives or penalties tied to exam retakes, pass rates, drop-outs
4 Quick answers to your concrete questions
That’s the whole picture—no hidden per-student pay, but plenty of funding formulas one step above the individual lecturer.
NRW Performance-Based Funding (LOM) – Master’s Degrees & “On-Time” Factor
Table 75
Sub-rule
Weight in the LOM algorithm
Source
Graduate finishes within the standard study period
There are no rows in this table
How the two factors interact
The multipliers are cumulative:
Weighted value = Degree-type factor × “On-time” factor
Thus an on-time Master counts for only half the weight of an on-time Bachelor. Rationale: NRW mainly wants to promote the first degree but still reward speedy completions. The weighted graduate numbers feed 50 % (universities) or 75 % (universities of applied sciences) of the LOM redistribution pool. Universities with above-average numbers of quick first degrees receive more state money, yet these funds reach only the institution or faculty level, not individual salaries. ()
Adjunct (Lehrbeauftragte) vs. Professor – Quick Overview
Table 76
Criterion
Lehrbeauftragte (Adjunct)
Professor (W-salary scale)
Source
Legal status
Freelance teaching contract; usually no employment contract
Tenured civil servant or permanent employee
Duties
Teaching only (mostly 2–4 SWS); no research duty; exams case-by-case
Teaching + research + self-governance; 8–9 SWS (uni), 16–18 SWS (UAS)
Pay
Fee per 45-min SWS; NRW €24–40 (typ. €25–30)
Salary table W1–W3 (~€4 600–7 000 gross/month) + performance bonuses
Social protection
No social insurance via university; self-funded health/pension
Full civil-service/employee coverage
Career & voice
No tenure track; no voting rights in university bodies
Lifetime position, voting rights, hiring & budget responsibility
Incentives
Professional networking, honorarium, practical expertise
Research funds, LOM results, individual performance bonuses
There are no rows in this table
Key points for instructors
Quick Take-aways
German Public University – Business Model (2025 snapshot)
Table 73
Canvas block
Core elements
Impact on students
Value proposition
Tuition-free first degree, research-based teaching, recognised qualifications, public-service ethos
Low financial barrier but crowded programmes
Customers / stakeholders
Students, governments (Bund/Länder), research funders, industry, society
Wide access; many actors set sometimes-conflicting goals
Revenue streams
• State base grant ≈ 70 % • Performance-based block (LOM) 20-30 % – weighted by graduates, on-time completions (×1.5), third-party € etc. () • “Zukunfts?vertrag” joint programme: €3.8 → 4.4 bn p.a. 2024-27 () • Research contracts (e.g. TU Munich €857 k per prof, 2022) () • Minor tuition: long-study fees (€500/semester in some Länder) ()
Funding follows head-count and outputs, not class quality; large cohorts, lean services
Key activities
Teaching (measured in SWS), research, knowledge-transfer
High lecturer load; limited individual feedback
Key resources
Precarious staff can reduce continuity in supervision
Key partners
DFG, EU, industry; transport & student-service bodies
Joint projects, internship routes, but also KPI pressure
Cost structure
≈ 70 % personnel; infrastructure, digital platforms
Savings often made on student support & contact time
Channels
Central admission portals, teaching platforms, faculty outreach
High digital admin load; mixed UX
There are no rows in this table
Cultural consequences of the funding logic
Table 74
Mechanism
Likely culture effect
Graduate & grant KPIs (LOM, rankings)
Metric-driven “managerial” layer; publish-or-perish, target agreements, audit routines → risk of perfectionism & overload (, )
Short-term academic jobs (WissZeitVG)
Precarity, competition, #IchBinHanna protests; can foster toxic stress among early-career staff ()
No per-student tuition income
Less marketisation than UK/US; core collegial ethos and academic freedom remain strong
On-time completion bonus
Tighter exam timetables, reduced retake tolerance; student stress but faster degrees ()
Student evaluations linked to internal budgets
Potential grade inflation or defensive teaching; raises service awareness
There are no rows in this table
Net result: a hybrid culture – public-service & collegial at its core; overlaid by KPIs that can tip into perfectionism when staffing lags behind enrolment. Where management reinvests performance money in permanent posts and support services, the environment stays demanding but healthy. Where it doesn’t, pressure escalates.
How to keep it healthy (actionable ideas)
These tweaks align the business model with a sustainable, inclusive academic culture rather than a relentlessly metric-driven one.
How student evaluations of teaching (SETs) are tied to money inside German public universities
Table 71
Step
Typical implementation
Example evidence
1 Data collection
Online survey at the end of every course; 10-25 Likert items on organisation, clarity, perceived learning, etc.
Cologne & Bonn medical faculties run a standardised questionnaire via Evasys. ()
2 Score → index
Faculty QA units aggregate the item means to one evaluation score for each institute/clinic.
Bonn groups “organisation, structure, content” into a single key figure. ()
3 Budget formula
A fixed slice of the annual teaching pot is redistributed by rank: high scores gain, low scores lose. Typical slice = 15-30 %.
Bonn Medical: 25 % of the teaching budget is re-pooled every year according to SET scores. ()MHH Hannover: Pilot “qualitative LOM-Lehre” shifted €420 000 in 2009; 50 % went straight to lecturers, 50 % to departments. ()
4 Spending rules
Extra funds are earmarked for teaching purposes (tutors, e-learning licenses, small bonuses) but never touch basic salary tables.
There are no rows in this table
Why universities link SETs to budgets
Intended and unintended cultural effects
Table 72
Effect pathway
Positive side
Risk / downside
Empirical hints
“Customer-service” mindset
Faster feedback cycles, better slides/organisation, more approachable staff.
Treating students as clients can erode academic rigour.
Budget stakes (15-30 %)
Departments invest in didactics, peer-observation, tutor staffing.
Competition between chairs may turn toxic if pots are tight.
Bonn explicitly worries about “stetig steigende Volumen” and is considering caps. ()
SETs + grading
Quick diagnostic of teaching issues.
High expected grades correlate with higher SETs → grade-inflation incentive.
Indicator-funding pressure
Focus on measurable outcomes (completion, SET) can streamline curricula.
Perfectionism & stress for staff; but study of NRW reforms found no systemic grade inflation overall. (
)
Equity & bias
SETs surface organisational flaws seen by students.
Gender, ethnicity and accent biases distort scores; needs statistical correction.
There are no rows in this table
Bottom line for student experience and culture
A concise heuristic: ≤20 % budget via SETs + robust bias correction = healthy spur; > 30 % and no controls = recipe for grade-driven toxicity.
Thesis-supervision incentives at German public universities (2025)
Table 69
Level
Standard rule
Typical numerical value
Cash bonus?
Key sources
Bachelor thesis
Counts toward teaching load (SWS)
0.3 SWS per thesis, max 3 SWS/semester
No
Master thesis
Counts toward teaching load (SWS)
0.5 SWS per thesis, max 3 SWS/semester
No
Doctoral thesis
No SWS credit in NRW; similar in most Länder
–
Rare bonuses (see below)
There are no rows in this table
Rare monetary schemes for doctorates
Table 70
Scheme
Where in use
Amount & trigger
Details
Fast-completion premium
Univ. Kassel (all faculties, 2024 – )
€3 000 to the supervisor’s cost centre if the PhD is finished in ≤ 4 yrs (contract) or ≤ 3 yrs (stipend)
“Promotion bonus” for chairs
Several Bavarian universities of applied sciences
≈ €1 500 per completed doctorate, booked to the chair/faculty budget
External examiner fee
If a thesis reviewer comes from another university
€200 – €400 honorarium (or none, e.g. Cologne humanities)
There are no rows in this table
Adjunct (Lehrbeauftragte)
Paid strictly per teaching hour; supervising theses is normally excluded or, at best, compensated by a small one-off fee (< €100). No link to SWS or bonuses. ()
Practical consequences for students
Bottom line: For Bachelor/Master work, the reward is merely a small reduction in other teaching hours; for doctorates, only a handful of universities pay real money, and even then it is routed to budgets, not personal salaries. Germany’s public system still relies mainly on intrinsic and reputational motives rather than cash incentives.
How PhD candidates in Germany are paid & incentivised to teach and examine
Table 80
Situation
What a doctoral candidate gets
Source
Employed on a TV-L research contract (most common)
• Salary: E 13 scale (≈ €4 200–5 000 gross at 100 % → ≈ €2 100–2 500 gross at 50 %) ()
→ Teaching duty (state‐funded post)
2 SWS per semester at 50 % position (scale up/down with contract size) – teaching is part of paid working hours, no extra money ()
→ Teaching duty (externally-funded post)
Usually 0 SWS in the contract; candidates may still teach to meet faculty rules or boost C.V. ()
Fixed-term scientific staff in general
Typical obligation 2–4 SWS if the contract is temporary; 8–10 SWS only for permanent research staff ()
Doctoral regulations (degree requirement)
Many faculties demand a minimum number of taught hours even when the contract says none – e.g.
Scholarship-funded / external PhDs
No salary, no formal duty; teaching paid as a hourly tutor/WHK job (≈ €14 – 20 / h in NRW 2025) ()
Exam supervision / paper marking
Paid only when a separate piece-rate contract is signed – e.g. €11 per written exam script at Cologne Law Faculty
There are no rows in this table
Incentives & disincentives in practice
Net effect on culture
In short, German PhD candidates must teach just enough to satisfy contracts and doctoral regulations; money is modest and largely flat-rate, so the real incentives are timely graduation, C.V. building, and future academic eligibility, not cash bonuses.
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