DISEC Background Guide

The United Nations Disarmament and International Security Committee.

Agenda:

Reducing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons Strengthening international frameworks to prevent the proliferation and use of biological and chemical weapons.

Chairperson’s Letter:

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to this session of the First Committee (DISEC) of the United Nations General Assembly. Over the next few days, we will tackle one of the most pressing security challenges facing our global community: strengthening international frameworks to prevent the proliferation and use of biological and chemical weapons.

The threat of these weapons remains a serious concern. Despite existing treaties like the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), recent years have shown troubling gaps in our ability to prevent their development and potential use. Many nations lack proper laboratory security protocols, and the rise of synthetic biology has made it easier to create dangerous pathogens. Meanwhile, chemical precursors that could be used for weapons continue to move across borders without adequate tracking.

Our committee must address specific questions: How can we improve the BWC's verification system, which currently lacks formal inspection protocols? What steps should be taken to better monitor the trade of dual-use materials – items that have both peaceful and weapons applications? How can we help developing nations implement stronger safety measures in their research facilities?

Your task will be to draft resolutions that propose concrete solutions to these challenges. Consider practical measures like creating an international team of weapons inspectors, establishing a global database for tracking suspicious chemical purchases, or developing new training programs for biosecurity.

Remember that as delegates, you represent your country's interests while working toward our shared goal of a safer world. We encourage you all to research your country's stance on biological and chemical weapons treaties, their laboratory security measures, and their history with these weapons programs.

The chairs trust that you will approach these discussions with professionalism and creativity. Do not hesitate to raise your placard, engage in debate, and form alliances to create meaningful solutions.

Yours sincerely,

Aritro G and Sneha M, Chairs,

Background Guide:

Historical Context

The first widespread use of chemical weapons occurred during World War I, when Germany deployed 168 tons of chlorine gas at Ypres in 1915, killing 5,000 soldiers in a single day. By the war's end, over 124,000 tons of chemical agents had been used, causing 1.3 million casualties. The development of these weapons marked the beginning of modern chemical warfare, leading to an arms race that would span decades.

During World War II, Japan's notorious Unit 731 conducted extensive biological weapons experiments in occupied China, causing an estimated 200,000 casualties. The program tested eleven different pathogens on human subjects, establishing the terrifying potential of biological weapons. The Cold War subsequently saw massive expansion of both chemical and biological weapons programs, with the Soviet Union's Biopreparat program employing over 50,000 people across 52 sites, while the United States stockpiled 31,500 tons of chemical agents by 1967.

Current Legal Frameworks

The Biological Weapons Convention, established in 1972 and entering into force in 1975, now encompasses 184 member states. Despite its broad membership, the convention faces significant challenges. Only 46% of member states submit regular confidence-building measures, and the absence of a formal verification mechanism has led to persistent concerns about compliance. The convention's annual implementation budget of $1.4 million proves woefully inadequate for monitoring the estimated 22 countries suspected of maintaining biological weapons capabilities.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, implemented in 1997, has achieved greater success in verification and enforcement. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has conducted over 4,200 inspections across 87 countries, overseeing the destruction of 72,304 metric tonnes of chemical agents – representing 98% of declared stockpiles. With an annual budget of €70.4 million, the OPCW monitors more than 5,000 inspectable facilities worldwide, though resource constraints limit inspection frequency.

Recent Challenges

Syria's use of chemical weapons represents one of the most serious violations of international law in recent history. The 2013 Ghouta attack killed over 1,400 civilians and left 3,600 patients with neurotoxic symptoms, marking the largest chemical weapons attack since 1988. Subsequent attacks at Khan Shaykhun in 2017 and Douma in 2018 killed dozens more and injured hundreds, demonstrating the ongoing threat of these weapons despite international prohibitions.

The Novichok incidents have highlighted the evolution of chemical weapons and their potential for targeted assassinations. The 2018 Salisbury attack in the UK affected 48 people and required a £7.5 million decontamination effort, while the 2020 poisoning of Alexei Navalny involved a novel Novichok variant, demonstrating continued development of these agents. These cases exposed significant gaps in international response capabilities and attribution mechanisms.

Technological Challenges

The rise of dual-use materials presents a critical challenge to control efforts. Current estimates indicate that 14 of the 20 major vaccine production systems have potential weapons applications, while 65% of commercial lab equipment could be repurposed for weapons development. The legitimate global trade in dual-use materials, valued at $54 billion annually, complicates efforts to prevent proliferation while maintaining essential civilian research and industry.

Modern technological advances have dramatically reduced barriers to weapons development. CRISPR gene editing costs have dropped 99% since 2015, while DNA synthesis costs have plummeted from $1 to $0.07 per base pair. Automated synthesis capabilities, now present in 37% of BSL-3+ laboratories, have reduced the technical expertise required for genetic modification by 90%, raising serious concerns about potential misuse.

Verification Challenges

The BWC's lack of verification mechanisms represents a critical weakness in biological weapons control. With zero permanent verification staff and only 42% of states submitting complete annual reports, suspicious activities often go unreported for an average of 2.3 years. Implementing a comprehensive verification protocol would require an estimated $100 million annually – far exceeding the convention's current budget.

The CWC's verification regime, while more robust, faces significant resource constraints. In 2021, only 241 industry inspections were conducted, representing an 18% decrease in inspection capacity since 2015. Approximately 3,300 chemical production facilities have never been inspected, and routine inspections occur on average every 4.2 years – far too infrequent to ensure compliance.

Emerging Threats

Non-state actors pose an increasing proliferation risk, with 23 terrorist groups known to have sought chemical or biological weapons capabilities. Since 2001, authorities have documented 115 confirmed attempts to acquire materials, while the average cost to produce a basic biological agent has dropped to approximately $10,000. Online trading of precursor chemicals has increased 67%, creating new procurement pathways for malicious actors.

State-level threats persist despite international prohibitions. Eight states are currently suspected of maintaining offensive programs, while 23 conduct "defensive research" that could be rapidly converted to weapons development. Twelve states possess breakout capacity within six months, supported by an average annual spending of $4.5 billion on defensive programs that maintain technical expertise and infrastructure.

Looking Forward

Strengthening international frameworks requires substantial investment in verification, security, and capacity building. Establishing effective BWC verification would require 150 trained inspectors conducting 400 annual inspections, with an implementation timeframe of 3-5 years. Laboratory security upgrades for over 3,000 BSL-3 facilities would cost an estimated $2.5 billion, while a global chemical tracking system would require $500 million plus training for 25,000 customs officials.

The international community must also enhance response capabilities through rapid reaction teams and strategic stockpiles. Eight proposed rapid response teams, capable of deploying within 48 hours, would require $75 million in annual operating costs. Fifteen strategic stockpile locations would provide critical response materials, though maintaining these stockpiles represents a significant ongoing investment in global security.

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