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A big thing would be to focus on any lease ups stats this month and the plan to keep getting new tenants.

Thu, Sep 18

An update on the ad spend ROI would be great too.

Thu, Sep 18

Review rates at both Verona and Ocean City make adjustments to drive rental growth

@Larissa Fincher

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Thu, Sep 18

Auctions contributed mostly to vacates

Thu, Sep 18

Aggressive Promo

@Andrew Aue

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Thu, Nov 20

Rate Review

@Larissa Fincher

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Thu, Nov 20

Track Cube Smart

@Andrew Aue

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Thu, Nov 20

There are no rows in this table

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Cubby

use email address for both the username and password

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https://app.cubbystorage.com/signin⁠

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Ocean City

🔍 Key Problems Identified

Net Loss in Occupancy: 67 move-ins vs. 77 move-outs = 10 fewer occupied units YTD.

Delinquency Impact: 11 auctions due to non-payment; over $13K in write-offs and $11K+ in long-term delinquency still outstanding.

Lead Dropoff: Fewer new inquiries in late Q3–Q4; online aggregator leads underperformed in conversions.

Vacate Reasons: 53% said “no longer need storage” (often a catch-all), 14% were auctioned, few left due to price (but likely underreported).

Climate-Controlled Units Lag: 55–73% occupancy in these, vs. 85–94% in drive-ups and parking. Pricing may be too high for market demand.

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📈 Performance Highlights

YTD Revenue: $271,797 (strong growth; peak months: July & September).

Economic Occupancy > 100%: Strong revenue per unit due to effective rate increases.

Insurance Penetration: 80% of tenants enrolled—healthy ancillary income stream.

Fee Revenue: $6.4K in late fees shows strong enforcement but signals payment issues.

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✅ Recommendations

Rebalance Pricing: Adjust climate unit rates or offer promotions to boost fill rate.

Tighten Collections: Shorten delinquency cycle, proactively address overdue accounts.

Improve Lead Conversion: Re-engage online channels, speed up follow-up, optimize call center scripts.

Target Retention: Engage tenants before vacate, offer incentives for longer stays.

Understand Exits Better: Improve move-out surveys to capture real reasons and spot trends.

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Verona

📈 Performance Highlights

Total Revenue: $136,030

Occupancy: 90.0% of units; 92.6% of square footage

Economic Occupancy: 108.1% (reflects rate increases and insurance)

Move-Ins vs. Move-Outs: 93 move-ins vs. 89 move-outs → net gain of 4 units

Lead Conversion: 173 leads with 45.7% conversion rate – strong sales execution

Insurance Enrollment: 87.8% of tenants enrolled → $12.7K in added revenue

Payments: 100% electronic; 94% by credit card

✅ Wins

Quick lease-up with strong revenue growth from $0 in Q1 to $24.5K in October

Excellent insurance penetration and economic occupancy above 100%

High lead conversion rate and effective digital marketing performance

Strong collections with minimal delinquency and all-electronic payments

⚠️ Action Areas

High summer move-outs (churn); net gain in occupied units was modest

$19K in discounts/write-offs → tighten promotions & credit control

$4K in current tenant delinquency (mostly short-term) → continue collection pressure

No retail/merchandise revenue → explore small ancillary sales

Future revenue growth depends on effective rate management (not just occupancy)

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Year-to-Date Performance Analysis – Ocean City Self Storage (2025)

Lead Volume and Conversion Rates

Ocean City Self Storage generated 100 rental leads year-to-date, of which 50 converted to move-ins (50% conversion). Lead sources were dominated by phone inquiries via the call center – nearly half of all leads (47) – with the remainder primarily from online aggregators and web marketing. According to the lead data, the call center leads converted at a relatively strong rate (~57% of call-in leads became rentals), whereas third-party online leads (e.g. SpareFoot) showed lower conversion (on the order of 25–30%). This gap suggests that prospective tenants from aggregators may be more price-sensitive or competitive, indicating a potential opportunity to improve follow-up or pricing for those channels. By contrast, a small number of true walk-in/on-site prospects were few but highly likely to rent (all on-site inquiries resulted in move-ins in the data).

Lead activity was heaviest in the spring and early summer and then declined in the later months. For example, April saw around 18 new leads (during initial lease-up efforts), whereas by October/November new inquiries had slowed to only ~5 or fewer per month (likely due to seasonality or market saturation). The overall 50% lead-to-rental conversion is fairly solid, but the drop-off in lead volume in Q3–Q4 meant fewer move-ins to offset ongoing move-outs. Enhancing marketing efforts going into the slower seasons (and boosting the facility’s online visibility or local advertising) could help sustain a higher flow of prospects to counteract vacancies.

Top Lead Sources: The call center was the single largest source of rentals, accounting for a majority of the move-ins. Online marketing services also contributed a significant share – for instance, Storagely and SpareFoot (third-party listing services) together drove roughly 20–30% of total leads. However, many of those online leads did not convert, as evidenced by only 10 of the SpareFoot leads and 13 of the Storagely leads turning into move-ins YTD. The management summary categorizes the remaining smaller sources (including any multi-source attributions or existing-tenant referrals) as “Other” (~15 leads). The relatively lower conversion from aggregator leads may point to pricing or competition issues – e.g. prospects shopping around on SpareFoot might have found better rates elsewhere. It may be worth evaluating pricing competitiveness on those platforms or improving responsiveness (since aggregator customers often expect quick confirmation and competitive specials).

Move-Ins, Move-Outs, Net Rentals, and Transfers

Year-to-date rental activity shows 67 total move-ins and 77 move-outs, yielding a net loss of 10 occupied units over the period. In other words, the facility moved in fewer new tenants than it lost, a concerning trend for occupancy growth. The net rentals YTD stand at –10 units. Only 2 unit transfers occurred during the year, so nearly all move-outs represent tenants fully leaving rather than internal unit swaps.

Figure: Monthly move-ins vs. move-outs in 2025. Move-outs spiked in mid-summer (July), greatly exceeding move-ins and causing a drop in occupancy.

Looking at the monthly pattern (see Figure above), the facility experienced an initial surge of move-ins in spring, followed by a sharp increase in move-outs during the summer. Notably, April had the highest number of move-ins (15 new rentals) as the facility was ramping up, while July saw a dramatic spike with 18 move-outs in that single month. Move-outs in July far outpaced new move-ins (only 3 in July), resulting in a significant occupancy drop. August and September continued to see move-outs (10 and 11, respectively) outnumber move-ins (3 and 6), though not as severely as July. By October and early November, move-out volume had moderated (8 in October, 5 in November) but still slightly exceeded move-ins. This sequence explains the net loss of occupied units over the year.

The mid-year exodus appears to be a major factor in the facility’s performance struggles. July’s unusually high attrition was partly driven by management actions on delinquent units – in fact, internal records show that 10 of the July move-outs were due to auction lien sales (i.e. units emptied for non-payment). This large batch of auctions, combined with normal summer turnover, led to a sudden occupancy dip. After July, the facility was essentially playing catch-up: the incoming tenant flow in late Q3 and Q4 was not sufficient to fully replace those who left. The lack of transfers (only 2 tenants transferred to different units all year) indicates that unit-size mismatches or upsell/downsizing were minimal; the move-outs were largely genuine tenant departures.

Net Rental Trend: Prior to the summer drop, the facility had been growing occupancy modestly. In Q2 (spring), move-ins outpaced move-outs by a small margin (e.g. April had +4 net units, May was flat, June +2). Occupancy likely peaked around early summer. However, the string of negative net rental months from July onward erased those gains. As of mid-November, the facility’s occupied unit count is 10 units lower than at the start of the year. In terms of square footage, that net loss equates to roughly –490 sq ft of rented space (the facility is currently 42,595 sq ft occupied out of 51,305 sq ft total) – a decline from about 84% to 83% of space occupied. While that percentage drop (–1 to –2% in area occupancy) seems small, it masks the churn underneath and the missed opportunity to fill an expanded capacity.

Transfers: Only two transfer events were logged (one in April, one in September), indicating that few tenants changed unit sizes. One transfer involved a tenant moving from one drive-up unit to another; the other was an outdoor parking tenant moving to a different space. The low number of transfers suggests that most move-outs were true exits rather than shifting to alternate units. It also implies that unit mix may not be a major internal issue – tenants generally either found their initial unit adequate or left the facility entirely (rather than downsizing/upgrading on-site).

Occupancy Trends (Physical vs. Economic)

As of November 12, 2025, physical occupancy stands at 237 units occupied out of 296 (about 80.1% unit occupancy), with 54 units vacant (18.2%) and a couple of units either reserved or offline. This is a drop from roughly 83–84% occupancy at the start of the year (the facility had ~247 occupied units on Jan 1, given the net –10 change). In terms of square footage, current physical occupancy is 42,595 sq ft rented out of 51,305 sq ft (about 83.0% of space occupied). The slight difference – higher percentage of sq ft occupied than units – indicates that, on average, some larger units are occupied or that smaller units make up a share of the vacancies.

However, occupancy is not evenly distributed across unit types. Occupancy rates vary significantly by unit size/type: Smaller drive-up units and parking spaces are near full, while larger climate-controlled units have lagging occupancy. For example, only 11 of 20 climate-controlled 10×20 units are occupied (~55%), and only 53 of 73 climate 10×15 units (~73%) are occupied, which is well below the facility average. In contrast, outdoor parking spaces (12×40) are 34 of 36 occupied (~94%), and the smaller drive-up units (e.g. 5×10, 10×10) are generally 85–90% full. Even the largest drive-up units (10×30) show strong occupancy (~91%). This pattern suggests a specific softness in demand for the climate-controlled units, especially the mid-to-large sizes, whereas traditional drive-up storage and vehicle/boat storage are performing quite well.

Several factors could be contributing to the low occupancy in certain unit types. It could be pricing-related – the climate-controlled units may be priced above what the local market will bear, leading to slower fill. The standard rates are around $119 for a 10×15 climate unit and $159 for a 10×20 climate unit, which might be deterring some price-conscious customers if competitors offer cheaper climate space. It might also reflect oversupply or lower demand for climate storage in this market: perhaps most customers in the Bishopville/Ocean City area prioritize drive-up convenience or only need climate control for smaller items. The facility has a large number of climate units (over 70 of 10×15 and 20 of 10×20), so a targeted effort may be needed to boost occupancy in those categories, such as special promotions or rate adjustments.

On the other hand, the high occupancy of parking spaces (94%) indicates strong demand for boat/RV/vehicle storage – not surprising given the coastal location. These spaces are priced at ~$69/month (for 12×40 outdoor), a relatively low price per square foot (only ~$0.14 per sq ft). With such high fill, the facility might have room to raise rates on parking over time or consider expanding vehicle storage if feasible. The drive-up units also show healthy occupancy in the 85–90% range at current rates, which implies those price points ($59–$99 for small drive-ups) are in line with demand.

Economic Occupancy: Despite physical occupancy being ~80%, the facility’s economic occupancy is over 100% of standard rental potential. In fact, the current report shows an economic occupancy of 103.11% – meaning the actual rent being collected on occupied units exceeds the theoretical rent if all units were occupied at their standard rates. The facility is collecting ~$33,742 in rent on the current occupancy, versus ~$32,725 if 100% full at standard rates. This remarkable figure indicates that many tenants are paying above the standard rate, likely due to incremental rate increases, premium charges, or fees. Essentially, management has successfully pushed rates on existing customers beyond the posted standard rates (yielding an extra ~$8,000 per month above “face value” potential). While this aggressive revenue management boosts income (and helped achieve record revenues in Q3), it may also be a double-edged sword if it contributed to higher move-outs. Some tenants may have left because of rate hikes or fee increases, citing that they “don’t need storage” as a proxy for dissatisfaction. It will be important to balance high economic yield with retention. Still, the high economic occupancy suggests pricing power in the market for those tenants who remain, and it’s a positive sign that the facility is maximizing revenue on occupied units.

Revenue Performance (Monthly & Quarterly)

Total year-to-date revenue through Nov 12, 2025 is $271,797. Since the facility was new or under new management starting in 2025 (no revenue in Q1), there is no direct prior-year comparison, but we can examine monthly and quarterly trends for 2025:

Monthly Revenue: After a $0 revenue start in Jan–Mar (reflecting pre-opening or free-rent period), revenue ramped up in Q2 and peaked in mid-year. April’s revenue was $29,594, then May $35,663, and June $35,184. The highest monthly revenue came in July ($37,593), with another peak in September ($37,045). By comparison, August and October were a bit lower (~$33.5K each), and November (partial month as of the 12th) stood at $29,778. The figure below illustrates the monthly revenue trend from April through November:

Figure: Monthly total revenue collected in 2025 (Apr–Nov). Revenue peaked in July and September around $37k, then trended down by November. Q3 was the strongest quarter for revenue.

Quarterly Revenue: In Q2 2025 (Apr–Jun), the facility earned $100,440. This grew to $108,123 in Q3 (Jul–Sep), a +7.6% increase quarter-over-quarter. The revenue growth in Q3 occurred despite losing net tenants, indicating that higher rates and fewer discounts were in play by summer. Q4 is not complete, but through early November the quarter had $63,235 booked; it will likely finish lower than Q3, given the reduced occupancy and seasonally slower rentals. Overall, the facility appears to have maximized revenue in the summer high season, then saw a slight decline moving into fall.

Breaking down the revenue streams, the vast majority (about 93%) is from storage rental income. Rental unit revenue (including storage units and parking) totals roughly $252,920 YTD. Of that, approximately $11,829 (4.7%) came from parking space rentals specifically, and the remainder (~$241K) from traditional storage unit rent. The facility also earned $11,139 from tenant insurance sales (policies to protect stored goods), which is a strong ancillary income stream – about 4% of revenue. Notably, the insurance penetration rate is about 80% of tenants (191 out of 238 tenants enrolled), which is quite high and reflects a successful push to have tenants carry insurance (often a revenue-sharing program).

Fee income was another contributor: about $7,609 in fee revenue was collected YTD. Most of this came from late fees (over $6,400) and some admin fees. The high late fee total ties to the delinquency issues discussed later, but it did boost revenue. There was negligible merchandise or retail sales at this facility (no notable income from locks, boxes, etc.), so essentially all revenue is from renting space and related fees.

The revenue trend suggests that while occupancy slipped, the facility compensated via rate optimization. The peak revenues in July and September coincided with the highest economic occupancy and late fees. By November, revenue per month declined, likely reflecting the loss of paying tenants and perhaps fewer new move-ins paying admin fees or fewer tenants incurring late charges. As the facility heads into year-end at ~80% occupancy, there is headroom to grow revenue by filling vacant units – though that may require pricing adjustments or promotions that could temporarily lower rate per unit. Management will need to weigh the trade-off between occupancy vs. rate as they strategize for the coming year.

Rent Collection and Delinquency Metrics

Delinquency and collections have been a challenge for this facility in 2025. The current Accounts Receivable (A/R) aging report shows 30 tenants owe a total of $11,007 in past-due charges. Breaking that down: about $2,706 is 11–30 days past due (16 tenants), $2,287 is 61–90 days (3 tenants), $4,428 is 91–120 days (8 tenants), and $1,478 is 120+ days delinquent (2 tenants). In other words, over half of the delinquent balance is very seriously past due (90+ days). This is a red flag – several tenants have not paid in three to four months, and likely are in the lien process or pending auction. The total $11K delinquent represents roughly one-third of a month’s rent roll (since monthly rent potential is ~$33K), which is significant.

The collections issues earlier in the year culminated in 11 units being auctioned (lien sales) as noted previously. Those auctions (10 of which happened in July) cleared out many of the 90+ day balances at that time, resulting in write-offs of uncollected rent. Indeed, the financials show $13,029 in rent write-offs (bad debt) YTD, which presumably corresponds to uncollectible balances from those auctioned units or skips. Additionally, the facility waived $8,684 in fees (likely auction fees, late fees forgiven, or other concessions) and granted $11,746 in credits. In total, over $34,000 was given in allowances/adjustments to tenants this year. Some portion of that was promotional (e.g. “First Month Free” move-in credits – the data indeed shows several new tenants on free month promotions), and some was uncollectible debt. For a facility with ~$272K gross billings YTD, having $34K (about 12.5%) in credits, discounts, or write-offs is quite high. This indicates both generous initial promotions and a significant delinquency impact.

Rent collection efficiency can thus be improved. While most tenants pay via credit card or ACH (the facility received over 97% of payments by card, ~$264K, and $7K by ACH), a subset are chronically late or defaulting. The high late fee revenue ($6.4K) shows that many tenants incurred late charges, but ultimately some never paid and had to be auctioned. The management might consider tightening their collection timeline or improving tenant screening. Since this was effectively the first year of operation under new ownership, some delinquencies may have been inherited or represent cleaning out old accounts. The fact that 11 tenants were sent to auction suggests a backlog of non-payers that management addressed in one big push. Going forward, regular, smaller auctions and proactive collections (calls, emails after missed payments, payment plans for those struggling) could prevent such a large accumulation of arrears.

On a positive note, 80% of current tenants carry insurance, which not only provides ancillary revenue but also can mitigate the facility’s risk in events of damage – possibly reducing disputes that lead to non-payment. Additionally, aside from the troubled accounts, the majority of tenants are paying on time (the 0–30 day bucket is relatively low at ~$2.7K). The key is to reduce the long-tail of seriously delinquent accounts. The facility has already written off those that went to auction (hence the high write-off figure), so hopefully the delinquency rate will be lower going into next year after “resetting” these accounts.

In summary, delinquency was a significant drag on performance – necessitating auctions (lost units), creating uncollected revenue, and contributing to occupancy loss. It’s both a symptom and a cause of the occupancy struggles. Management should view this as a top area for operational improvement: better credit control, quicker lien enforcement in smaller batches, and perhaps tenant outreach before they become 3 months behind (to either get them on track or reclaim the unit sooner).

Vacate Reasons and Tenant Turnover Analysis

Understanding why tenants left is crucial to addressing performance issues. The move-out records provide some insight into vacate reasons given by departing tenants:

“No longer need storage” – 41 move-outs (≈53%). By far the most common reason, this is a general category. It often includes temporary users who only needed storage for a short term, seasonal users, or those who might have left for personal reasons (sold their belongings, finished a project, etc.). Given the context, many initial tenants took advantage of the new facility and promotions for short-term needs and left once those needs ended. However, it’s worth noting that sometimes customers may cite “don’t need it” even if underlying factors like price or inconvenience influenced them. The high proportion here suggests a lot of churn from non-long-term customers.

Auction (non-payment) – 11 move-outs (≈14%). These were involuntary move-outs due to default. As discussed, this is unusually high; in a stabilized facility, typically only a small percentage of tenants end up in auction. The large number indicates the facility went through a purge of delinquents. This is a one-time hit, but it also means 11 units were suddenly vacant, requiring re-leasing.

Moving (relocation) – 5 move-outs (6%). A few tenants left because they moved residences or locations. This is a normal reason that is often unavoidable from management’s perspective (life events).

Vacated without notice – 4 move-outs (5%). These are skip-outs where the tenant left their unit (often empty, sometimes not) without formally notifying. They often coincide with delinquency (i.e. they abandon the unit and stop paying). These contribute to the collections problem since they likely ended up as write-offs or auctions as well.

Consolidating units – 2 move-outs (3%). In these cases, tenants had multiple units and moved out of one (presumably moving their items into another unit to save cost). This points to price sensitivity; they reduced their footprint, possibly after a rate increase or realizing they could fit in one unit. The facility lost the occupancy of those units, but at least kept the tenant on a smaller unit.

Transferring – 1 move-out (1%). One move-out reason given was “Transferring”, likely meaning the customer moved to another facility (perhaps closer to their new home or a competitor). This is a small number, but every loss to a competitor is worth examining if it becomes a trend.

(There were also 2 records labeled “TEST”, which appear to be dummy data or errors not reflective of actual tenant behavior.)

Vacate Reason Trends: The dominance of “no longer need” suggests that many tenants viewed their storage stay as temporary. Some of this is expected for a new facility – initial move-ins often include a wave of short-term users (e.g. someone storing while moving homes or during summer). However, it can also mask other issues. For instance, if tenants left due to rent increases or service issues but didn’t want confrontation, they might just say they didn’t need storage anymore. The absence of explicit “rate too high” or “found cheaper storage” responses is notable. It could mean the facility’s rates were not a commonly stated issue, or simply that the exit interviews didn’t capture that info. Considering occupancy in climate units is low, price might indeed be a factor for those units – prospective tenants never renting in the first place or existing ones choosing to consolidate or leave to avoid higher climate rates – but those reasons wouldn’t show up in move-out surveys unless the tenant volunteers it.

The large batch of auctions (14% of departures) skewed the year’s turnover reasons and points to an operational cleanup rather than typical tenant behavior. It’s good that those units have been addressed; going forward this category should shrink if delinquency is kept in check. The normal reasons (moving, done using storage) will always exist at some level – self storage has a naturally high churn rate industry-wide (annual turnover can be 50% or more). The key is retaining more of the long-term “sticky” customers and replacing short-term users quickly. The data shows a lot of short-term users in the first half (some only stayed a few months). The facility might improve on converting some of those into longer stays (perhaps by offering a discount if they stay beyond the promo period, etc.), or by targeting a more long-term customer base (such as local businesses needing storage, who tend to stay longer).

Key Issues Impacting Performance and Recommendations

Bringing together the above findings, several patterns and red flags have contributed to the facility’s underperformance. Below we identify these issues and suggest potential operational or strategic adjustments:

High Summer Churn and Occupancy Decline: The facility saw a steep drop in occupancy mid-year due to a combination of heavy move-out volume and delinquency auctions. This indicates a weakness in retention. Recommendation: Implement a retention program. For example, when a tenant’s intent to vacate is known, have managers reach out to understand why and possibly offer an incentive to stay (if the issue is price, perhaps a modest rate concession could save the rental). Also, spread out auction proceedings (e.g. quarterly instead of one large batch) to avoid a sudden occupancy shock. Earlier intervention on late accounts (calls, payment plans) might reduce how many reach auction in the first place.

Conversion and Marketing Gaps: While overall lead-to-rental conversion was decent at 50%, the facility relies heavily on the call center and aggregators for leads. The online aggregator leads converted poorly relative to others, and lead flow dropped in the latter half of the year. Recommendation: Examine the facility’s online marketing strategy. Possibly invest in improving the property’s listing rank on SpareFoot/Storagely via better pricing or promotions to attract more renters from those platforms (since that’s where many are searching). Additionally, consider local marketing to boost direct leads (Google Maps/SEO, local outreach) so that you’re not solely dependent on third-party aggregators. Improving follow-up speed and sales technique for web inquiries could also raise conversion – e.g. ensure that inquiries from SpareFoot are contacted immediately and given a compelling offer before they book elsewhere.

Pricing and Promotion Strategy: The data suggests the facility offered aggressive move-in promotions (like free months) to ramp up occupancy, and later implemented aggressive rent increases (economic occupancy >100%). Both tactics have pros and cons. The promotions filled the facility quickly but may have attracted a contingent of short-term bargain seekers who left once their discount period ended. The rent increases boosted revenue but may have driven away some tenants or pushed marginal accounts into default (auctions). Recommendation: Strive for a middle ground on pricing. For the under-filled climate-controlled units, consider adjusting rates downward or offering targeted promotions to improve their occupancy – they are a drag on revenue when sitting empty. Monitor competitor rates to ensure your climate units are priced competitively for the area. On the other hand, for high-demand segments (parking, small units), moderate rent increases are justified (and occupancy is still high). Just be cautious not to increase rates uniformly to the point that another wave of move-outs is triggered. A more nuanced revenue management approach is needed: raise rates on units/types that are 90+% occupied and hold or reduce rates on the sizes with high vacancy.

Unit Mix and Local Demand: The stark difference in occupancy between climate vs. drive-up units might indicate local market preferences. It’s possible that many customers in this market are storing items (beach gear, tools, etc.) that don’t strictly require climate control, or they are cost-sensitive and opt for cheaper drive-up space. The facility has a large inventory of climate-controlled space to fill. Recommendation: Increase the value proposition of climate units to attract customers – for example, highlight benefits (mold/mildew protection in the humid summer, etc.) in marketing, or bundle insurance discounts with climate units. If the issue is oversupply, you might repurpose or subdivide some larger climate units into smaller sizes that are more in demand (if feasible). Alternatively, if the climate building isn’t filling, consider more aggressive specials for those units (e.g. second month free, or a temporary rate reduction) to gain market share. Keep an eye on any new competitors offering climate space; you may need to match or beat their offers in the short term to stabilize occupancy.

Delinquency Management: Delinquency was clearly a pain point, leading to revenue loss and occupancy loss. Recommendation: Tighten the accounts receivable process. For 2026, set a goal to reduce the 90+ day delinquency significantly. This could include charging late fees right at the grace period to incentivize timely payment (which you did, given the late fee revenue), but more importantly, initiating lien notices promptly at, say, 30–45 days past due, and auction by 60–90 days. The quicker cycle prevents large balances from accruing. It appears the new management had to deal with inherited or initial delinquencies; now that those are mostly flushed out, maintaining discipline will be key. Additionally, screening new tenants (requiring valid ID, maybe not allowing rentals that seem high risk, etc.) could prevent some future skips.

Customer Base and Length of Stay: The first-year data suggests many tenants were short-term. Recommendation: Consider strategies to increase average length of stay. For instance, after a tenant’s initial rental period, offer a loyalty incentive: if they stay 6 months, give a small rent credit or a lock discount, etc., to encourage longer commitment. Business customers should be courted, as they often rent for longer durations – perhaps reach out to local businesses or contractors who might need storage, since they might favor climate units for files or inventory and stay year-round. Having a more balanced mix of customer types can reduce seasonal turnover.

Monitoring Vacate Reasons and Customer Feedback: It’s important to capture why customers leave in more detail. Recommendation: Improve the move-out survey process. Train staff (or call center) to ask a brief exit question when someone gives notice – if they say “no longer needed,” politely probe if everything was satisfactory or if there was any issue with the facility or cost. This can occasionally surface actionable feedback (e.g. if several people hint that rates were a bit high, that’s useful to know). Given the high economic occupancy, it would not be surprising if some left due to rate increases; confirming that through feedback can guide how aggressively to adjust rates in the future.

In conclusion, Ocean City Self Storage’s year-to-date performance shows strong revenue generation but at the cost of occupancy decline and high churn. The facility demonstrated it can achieve excellent economic yield (collecting more than the standard potential rent) and that there is solid demand for certain products (drive-up units, vehicle storage). However, it struggled with retaining tenants and keeping units filled, as evidenced by the net loss of occupied units and the significant turnover in the summer. By addressing the pain points – improving conversion of new leads, adjusting pricing strategy for weak unit types, tightening delinquency control, and focusing on customer retention – the facility should be able to stabilize and improve occupancy without sacrificing revenue. The local market’s demand profile (what sizes/types people want and at what price) is now clearer after this first year; management can use these insights to refine operations (for example, focusing marketing on filling those climate units and ensuring next summer’s rental season doesn’t see a repeat of mass tenant losses). With these adjustments, Ocean City Self Storage can turn its current performance struggles into opportunities for growth and stronger, steadier occupancy in the coming year.

Verona Storage – YTD 2025 Performance Update (as of Nov 12, 2025)

Overview

Verona Storage’s year-to-date performance in 2025 has been strong in several key areas, especially considering it was a new addition with no revenue recorded in Q1 2025. Total YTD revenue is approximately $136,030 (January 1 – Nov 12, 2025), with physical occupancy around 90% (271 of 301 units occupied as of Nov 12). The facility achieved a quick lease-up, reaching 95% occupancy by June, though occupancy dipped in late summer before recovering in fall. Lead generation and conversion have been robust – about 173 leads so far with a 45.7% conversion rate to move-ins. Below we break down performance by category, highlight trends with charts, and identify areas of strength and those needing attention for strategy adjustments.

Revenue Performance

Verona Storage has generated $136,030 in total revenue YTD. Notably, Q1 had no revenue (due to the facility’s initial lease-up period) and cash flow began in April. Since April, monthly revenue climbed steadily from ~$2.7K in April to a peak of ~$24.5K in October. October was the highest-grossing month so far, reflecting both high occupancy and ancillary income. Average monthly income in Q3 (July–Sept) was about ~$19.8K, up from ~$13.2K in Q2, demonstrating healthy growth as the property reached stabilized occupancy. November’s revenue is still in progress (about $12.55K collected by Nov 12) and will likely finish lower than October due to the earlier occupancy dip and timing of collections (most rents are collected by the 1st of the month). Overall, the trend has been upward through the year, with seasonal/lease-up effects noted.

Monthly revenue trend for Verona Storage in 2025 (April–November). November is partial month through Nov 12. The chart above illustrates the month-by-month revenue trajectory. After the facility began operations in Q2, revenue grew each month through the summer, with a slight pullback in August (coinciding with some occupancy loss) and a strong peak in October. This positive trend indicates successful lease-up and rental rate implementation. It’s also worth noting that there was no revenue in 2024 under current ownership (new facility), so the ~$136K YTD represents entirely new income for 2025.

Revenue by Category (YTD): Verona’s income is primarily driven by rental charges, supplemented by tenant insurance and fees. The breakdown is as follows:

Rent: $114,736 (≈84% of total revenue)

Tenant Insurance: $12,658 (≈9% of total)

Fees: $8,636 (≈6% of total), mostly from late fees and admin fees

Merchandise/Other: ~$0 (no material retail or other revenue)

This shows that core storage rental income is the main revenue stream, while insurance sales contribute a meaningful ancillary income. Fee revenue of ~$8.6K YTD consists largely of ~$6.3K in late fees and ~$1.8K in administrative fees, indicating that while the facility is enforcing fees for delinquency and setup, the reliance on these fees is minimal relative to rent. There is room to grow ancillary incomes like retail (locks, boxes, etc.), which are virtually nil so far.

Revenue Adjustments & Allowances: To drive occupancy during lease-up, Verona Storage offered promotions and had some uncollected revenue. Year-to-date total concessions/adjustments amount to $18,983 (about 14% of gross potential revenue). This includes about $1,474 in discounts (e.g. move-in specials), $7,289 in waived fees (for customer service or promos), and $9,016 in write-offs (bad debt). These allowances helped fill units but also represent revenue leakage. As the property stabilizes, we should aim to reduce reliance on concessions and tighten collections to minimize write-offs. The current delinquency is moderate – as of Nov 12, 31 tenants owed a total of ~$4,099 (mostly 1–30 days past due) – which is about 3% of annual revenue. While not alarming, continued attention to collections (late fees, lien process) will be important to keep bad debt in check.

Occupancy & Rental Activity

Physical occupancy has been strong overall, ending at 90.0% of units occupied (271 of 301 units) as of Nov 12. Occupancy began around ~89% in January (inherited tenants from prior to opening) and rose to a peak of ~95% in June as new move-ins outpaced move-outs. Mid-year, the facility experienced elevated move-outs – occupancy dipped to a low of ~86% in September – before recovering to ~90% by November as leasing picked back up. The net effect is a net gain of +4 occupied units since the start of the year, meaning the property grew from about 267 occupied units on Jan 1 to 271 units occupied now. While that net increase is modest, it masks significant churn and replacement of tenants over the year.

Physical occupancy rate (% of units occupied) by month in 2025. Nov indicates partial month as of Nov 12.* The above chart highlights the occupancy trend. The facility rapidly climbed into the 90+% occupancy range during spring, demonstrating strong initial leasing. Summer saw increased attrition, with move-outs peaking in July–September (e.g. 22 move-outs in July alone). This likely corresponds to many early tenants ending their stays (possibly after promotions ended or seasonal moves). By October and into November, occupancy rebounded as move-ins once again outnumbered move-outs. With 90% unit occupancy now, Verona Storage is effectively stabilized. Square-foot occupancy is even higher at ~92.6% (larger units are fully occupied), indicating remaining vacancies are primarily in smaller-sized units. The economic occupancy (rent collected vs. potential at standard rates) stands at 108.1% – above 100% because many units are rented above their standard rate (due to rate increases or premium fees) and from high insurance penetration. This suggests the property is maximizing revenue per occupied unit effectively.

Move-Ins & Move-Outs: A total of 93 move-ins have occurred YTD, balanced by 89 move-outs. Move-in activity was strongest in late spring and fall (15 new move-ins in October, for example) and slower in winter/early spring when the facility was first opening. Move-outs spiked in midsummer (e.g. 22 in July, 21 in September), which caused the temporary occupancy drop. Importantly, demand remains robust – the facility recorded 116 reservations YTD (prospects who held units for future rental), reflecting strong interest even if not all reservations converted. Only 4 unit transfers occurred YTD, so most move-ins were new customers, not existing tenants changing units. The net rental gain of 4 units YTD indicates that essentially all new rentals went toward replacing vacated units, which underscores the need to focus on tenant retention going forward (to turn strong leasing activity into occupancy growth, not just churn replacement).

Lead Volume & Conversion

Marketing and leasing efforts have yielded 173 leads (inquiries) so far in 2025. These leads have converted into 79 move-ins, which is a 45.7% conversion rate – a very solid performance indicating effective sales follow-up and strong demand. In November-to-date, for example, 16 new leads resulted in 7 move-ins (44% conversion). This conversion rate is above industry norms (often 20–30%), suggesting that Verona is attracting qualified prospects and successfully closing rentals. Much of the lead traffic is coming from online sources and call-ins. According to top lead source data, aggregator platforms (like SpareFoot) and the call center have been significant drivers of inquiries (over half of YTD leads). Walk-ins and drive-by traffic appear lower, implying that continued online marketing is key. Given the strong close rate, maintaining lead volume will directly impact occupancy. Total lead volume averaged ~20 leads/month in peak season (May–July) and has tapered slightly into the fall, so ensuring marketing efforts remain strong through the slower winter will be important to keep occupancy up. Overall, the high conversion rate is a bright spot, reflecting efficient handling of inquiries and demand matching the market.

Insurance Enrollment & Ancillary Income

The facility’s insurance penetration is excellent at 87.8% of tenants enrolled in a protection plan. Out of 271 occupied units, 238 tenants carry insurance through the store’s program, which not only mitigates risk but also generated $12,658 in insurance revenue YTD. This represents about 9% of total revenue – a profitable ancillary line. The high enrollment rate indicates that staff are effectively selling insurance to new move-ins (or requiring it), which is a best practice and an area of strong performance. We should aim to maintain insurance uptake around this level (or push toward 90%+) as new tenants come in.

Beyond insurance, other ancillary income streams have room for growth. The site recorded $0 in merchandise/retail sales (locks, boxes, etc.) this year. Implementing a retail sales initiative or simply asking new tenants about supply needs could create a small additional revenue stream. Also, while the facility earned ~$8.6K in fee revenue (mostly from late fees as noted), that is reactive income. Proactive income like tenant insurance is the star performer among ancillary categories for Verona Storage in 2025. Management might consider if any additional services (e.g. truck rentals, premium amenities) are feasible, but given the facility type (traditional drive-up self-storage), insurance remains the primary value-add sale. The focus should be on continuing this insurance success, as it boosts effective rent per unit significantly.

Collections & Payment Methods

Verona Storage has fostered a nearly 100% cashless payment environment, which is great for operational efficiency and security. All YTD receipts have been collected via electronic means – about 94% via credit/debit card and 6% via ACH/bank drafts, with effectively $0 in cash or check payments. This is depicted in the chart below. No tenants paid by cash, check, or money order in the reporting period, indicating that tenants are using the online portal or autopay systems. This is a strength in collections, as electronic payments tend to be more timely and require less manual handling. We should continue encouraging autopay enrollment to maintain this trend.

Receipts by payment type (YTD 2025). Credit card payments dominate, with the remainder via bank ACH. No cash/check payments were recorded. The heavy use of credit cards (over $127K of $136K receipts) and ACH (~$8K) suggests that nearly all tenants are on file with automatic payments or pay online – a positive sign for consistent collections. Consequently, collection rates have been high, with most rent collected on time each month. The current delinquency (about $4.1K outstanding) is relatively low in absolute terms, though we do see a handful of tenants incurring late fees as noted earlier. The fact that $6.3K in late fees was collected YTD means some tenants do fall behind, but the automated payments help limit the scope. Management should keep monitoring those 31 delinquent accounts (especially the few that are 31–60+ days past due) and enforce lien sale processes as needed to keep bad debt from growing. Overall, cash flow management is solid – the combination of autopay and strict fee enforcement has kept delinquencies from significantly impacting revenue.

Areas of Strong Performance

High Occupancy and Recovery: Sustained ~90%+ occupancy throughout the year. Even after a summer dip to ~86%, the facility quickly leased back up to 90% by Nov – indicating resilient demand. Occupancy by square footage (92.6%) is even higher, and economic occupancy (108%) shows strong rental rate achievement.

Revenue Growth: Steady increase in monthly revenue as the property moved from zero revenue in Q1 to over $24K/month by October. YTD income of $136K met or exceeded projections for a first-year lease-up. The revenue mix is healthy, with ~9% coming from high-margin insurance sales.

Lead Conversion & Leasing Effectiveness: Conversion of leads to rentals is ~45%, which is well above industry averages. This high conversion reflects efficient marketing and sales – staff are effectively turning inquiries into move-ins. Additionally, the large number of reservations (116 YTD) shows strong interest pipeline.

Insurance Penetration: Achieving nearly 88% tenant insurance enrollment is a standout success. This protects the facility and drives ancillary revenue ($12.7K YTD). Such a high uptake is indicative of good sales technique and/or rental policy (e.g. mandatory insurance).

Modern Payment Compliance: The facility has virtually all tenants on electronic payments (94% credit card, 6% ACH). This reduces defaults and administrative work. It also suggests many tenants are on autopay, aiding the strong collection rate (only ~3% of charges are delinquent).

Fee and Revenue Management: The property isn’t shy about enforcing fees – over $6K in late fees collected – which incentivizes timely payment. Simultaneously, rent rates have been managed such that actual income exceeds standard street rates (reflected in 108% economic occupancy). Management has balanced occupancy and rate to optimize revenue per available unit.

Areas Needing Attention

Tenant Retention / Move-Out Spike: The summer saw unusually high move-outs (July–Sept had 58 move-outs combined). This churn erased some occupancy gains and required many new move-ins just to maintain occupancy. We should investigate why so many tenants left mid-year – possibilities include promotion expirations, seasonal customers, or service issues. Improving retention (through renewals, rate incentives, or customer service) could turn leasing gains into net occupancy growth rather than just replacement.

Limited Net Occupancy Growth: Despite strong leasing, net occupancy grew only +4 units for the year. With 13 units still vacant and 6 reserved as of Nov, there’s opportunity to fill the remaining ~10% vacancy. Marketing could be targeted toward the unit sizes that are still open (e.g. smaller 6x10 units seem to have most vacancies). Achieving a true 95%+ stabilized occupancy consistently will boost revenue (each incremental occupied unit is ~$50–$150/month depending on size).

High Concessions and Write-Offs: Nearly $19K (14% of potential revenue) was given up in discounts, waived fees, and bad debt write-offs. While some concessions were expected in lease-up, we should scrutinize discounts and ensure promotions are effective (leading to long-term rentals, not just attracting short-term tenants who move out once discounts expire). The $9K in write-offs also suggests some tenants skipped out – tightening credit checks or increasing deposits might be considered to minimize future bad debt.

Delinquency Monitoring: Though current delinquency is not severe, 31 tenants owing $4K is something to watch. A few accounts are 30-90 days past due. Management should continue rigorous collections processes (calls, lien notices) to keep this in check. Reducing the reliance on late fee income by preventing late payments in the first place (e.g. more aggressive autopay signup, reminder texts before due dates) could improve cash flow and lower eventual write-offs.

Ancillary Revenue Opportunities: The facility made virtually no retail sales or other service income. While not a core revenue driver, offering locks, boxes, or partner services (like rental trucks) could enhance customer experience and add incremental revenue. Given the high insurance success, leveraging customer interactions for additional sales might be feasible. Even a small upsell per rental could modestly increase revenue and NOI.

Future Revenue Growth: With occupancy near capacity, revenue growth will need to come from rate management. Continuous market rate analysis and rate increases for existing tenants (as appropriate) will be important to grow income in 2026, since simply filling units is almost complete. The high economic occupancy indicates some success here, but as the market stabilizes, careful adjustments to street rates and tenant renewal rates will ensure Verona Storage continues to increase its revenue without sacrificing occupancy.

In summary, Verona Storage’s YTD 2025 performance is strong, especially for a first-year operation in lease-up. The property achieved high occupancy and solid income quickly, with excellent insurance attachment and payment collection practices. The key focus areas moving forward are improving retention to avoid large occupancy swings, tightening discounts/bad debt as the market stabilizes, and finding incremental revenue opportunities. By building on the strengths (sales conversion, insurance, rate management) and addressing the noted improvement areas, Verona Storage is well-positioned to finish the year on a high note and continue growing value into 2026.

MoM Reporting:

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APEX Meetings.xlsx

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