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Chapter II: The Nature of Consciousness

This chapter explores the nature of consciousness and its role in defining human specificity. Dewart argues that consciousness is not merely an organic function but an irreducible quality of human experience, characterized by self-presence. He further explores the consequences of consciousness for the human mode of life, including the sense of reality, selfhood, and the development of culture. Finally, he examines the relationship between consciousness and the human organism, proposing a monistic interpretation that avoids reductionism.

The Nature of Consciousness

Dewart argues that the defining characteristic of human beings is consciousness, the ability for organisms to have experience that is present to itself.

Consciousness is not merely a collection of biological processes, but a quality of experience that makes human life meaningful.

While consciousness is intermittent (we are not always conscious), the capacity for consciousness is continuous and defines the human specificity.

The defining characteristic of human beings is the conscious quality of their experiential processes. Everything that makes human life meaningful is either conscious or affects consciousness. While acknowledging the importance of the human organism, Dewart emphasizes that it is essential only because of its bearing on conscious experience and selfhood.

The Self-Presence of Consciousness

Dewart introduces the concept of self-presence to describe the essence of consciousness. This means that every conscious experience is present to itself in the act of experience.

He distinguishes between conscious experience and non-conscious experience. Non-conscious experience, like that of animals, involves receiving information from the world but without awareness of itself in the experience.

Self-presence is not the same as reflexion (thinking about a past experience). Consciousness is immediately present to itself, while reflexion is a separate act of conscious experience.

Self-presence is the essential characteristic of consciousness: In every conscious experience, the act of experiencing is as present in experience as the object of experience. He explains that we cannot be consciously aware of anything without simultaneously being aware that we are aware of it. Self-presence allows us to differentiate between the object of experience and the act of experiencing, giving rise to the sense of reality and selfhood.

The Experiential Base of Consciousness

Dewart explores the nature of experience, the organic function that can acquire conscious quality in humans.

He argues that all experience begins with sensation, the reception of information from the world.

He proposes a relativistic understanding of causality, where objects inform sentient organisms through their properties, without any transmission of substance or force.

He distinguishes between sentience (simple reception of information) and experience (processing and accumulating information to guide behaviour).

Dewart proposes a monistic interpretation of human nature, arguing that the human organism is a single element. He rejects reductionism, asserting that consciousness is not a function of the organism but an irreducible quality of its experiential functions. Consciousness arises from the complex way in which the human brain processes information.

The Consequences of Consciousness

Dewart discusses the implications of consciousness for human life and argues that consciousness allows us to experience the reality of the real, both of the world and of ourselves as selves.

This leads to the development of self-identity, which is to say that we create ourselves in relation to the world.

Consciousness also creates the socio-cultural environment: Becoming aware of ourselves and others as selves leads to the emergence of morality, religion, and culture.

The Relationship Between Consciousness and the Organism

Dewart addresses the traditional philosophical problem of unity, the relationship between mind and body.

He rejects both reductionism (reducing consciousness to a mere function of the brain) and dualism (seeing mind and body as separate entities).

He proposes that consciousness is an irreducible quality of the experiential functions of the organism, a “function of a function” of the brain.

He explains the causal interaction between mind and body as arising from the immanent causality of a single, circular process.

According to Dewart, an experience is to be understood and specifically defined as an event in the life of an organism. Consciousness too, as the peculiar way that humans experience, is an event in the life of specifically a (human) organism. Human beings are events. When the people cease to experience, they cease altogether.

The Assertiveness of Consciousness

Dewart highlights the assertive nature of consciousness, its ability to affirm the reality of the object it experiences.

He argues that consciousness does not receive information, but actively asserts the object as real and as being what it is.

This assertiveness is wordless in the case of sense experience, but becomes worded in the case of understanding.

He proposes that the assertiveness of consciousness resembles the assertiveness of speech, raising the question of a possible connection between the two.

Dewart argues that consciousness is not merely receptive but also assertive, meaning that it actively though implicitly affirms the reality of the object being experienced. Assertiveness is not a verbal declaration but an inherent quality of conscious experience, whereby the experiencer acknowledges the object’s informative role and “certifies” its reality. Assertiveness is crucial for the development of the sense of reality, selfhood, and the human mode of life.

The Potential for Self-Misinterpretation

Consciousness, despite its self-presence, is prone to self-misinterpretation.

Dewart attributes this to the possibility of deficient self-presence, a kind of “absent-mindedness” that leads to confusion about the nature of consciousness.

He argues that this absent-mindedness leads to the projection of assertiveness onto reality, mistaking consciousness for a mere repetition of the world.

This projection is the basis of many philosophical errors and hinders our understanding of ourselves and the world.

Self-presence, while enabling self-understanding, also contains the potential for self-misinterpretation. This arises from the possibility of “deficient self-presence,” where consciousness is not clearly and distinctly present to itself. This deficiency leads to misunderstandings about the nature of consciousness, such as the belief that consciousness repeats reality rather than asserting it originally. He refers to this disability as “absent-mindedness” and argues that it is the basis of projection and other forms of self-alienation.

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`Chapter I`⁠

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`Chapter III`⁠
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