#nakedmanagement

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Punish Agents to Reward Principals

Principals build stunning colleagues empowering your growth to build great things, successful clients and your stock option growing to real millions USD.
We started the day from a case of the behaviour.
Yaroslav showed how he put his new landing design into web for AB testing overnight at Sat hackathon. He made it overnight and saved 50 days of 5 people interacting to put his design into Jira, sprint, qa, prod.
That is 100-2500x performance of medium people.
:rocket:
PRINCIPAL maximises stocks value with 100-2500x performance. AGENT is a theft of your stock option. Here is how.
XXX - the project manager responsible for processes automation does not follow scrum stories rules and seems to be unaware how to write them.
Maybe our is unclear?
Wait, he had not checkmarked that he read this page.
Hm, a person responsible to automate onboarding ignore onboarding into operations processes.The Stories is a cornerstone of the Scrum as the Who needs Why for What format ensure transparency what teammates do and, most of all increase chance that they understand what they do. Without a clear story, teammates can not understand what other teammates are doing and train the habit to waste time, pretend to understand. Standards are getting lower. They are turning into dumb zombies with each sprint time.
Agents are very happy to have things blurred and dumb people to hide their fake work.
Our single advantage over big companies with army of clients, professionals and money is a greater opportunity to solve the principal-agent problem.
As a principal, you must make agency behaviour punished before it became Nash stable strategy in your unit, and habit wired into your brain. That is how you win the award - stunning colleagues empowering your growth to build great things, successful clients and your stock option growing to real millions USD.
Small theft by saving own time and effort at expense of big damage to the culture and teammates future should not be tolerated.
Olga transfer XXX unvested stock options to those who c.
PS. Principal-agent problem is a cornerstone to understand team performance. It is a part of contract and mechanism design theories - 5 Nobel Awards in economics: Arrow 1972, Muskin 2006, Hart & Holmstrom 2016, Milgrom 2020.
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